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CHURCH DISCIPLINE ON TRIAL: RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM VERSUS INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, under the common law of defamation, churches were
free to practice church discipline' without fear of litigation. The churches
were protected by a qualified privilege2 and were able to use truth as a
defense.- However, in the recent case of Marian Guinn v. The Church of
Christ of Collinsville, Oklahoma," the plaintiff challenged church discipline
as a tortious invasion of individual privacy. The result was a jury verdict for
the plaintiff and a new basis for tort claims against churches that report
even true private facts during church discipline proceedings.6 Attorneys
across the country have filed actions against churches7 replacing defamation
I. Church discipline refers to a church governmental process whereby churches deal
with members who violate the church's moral code. Church discipline involves confronting,
reproving, and ultimately excluding such a person from the church if their conduct is not
returned to doctrinal conformity. This procedure has its beginning in early Christian church
history and continues today based on adherence to many of the same principles. Churches may
vary in their interpretation and application of church discipline procedure. A general overview
will be provided to delineate the basic principles which churches follow to practice church
discipline. See infra text accompanying notes 13-31.
The goal of church discipline is twofold:
1) Correction and restoration of the erring member
2) Deterrence of similar conduct by other members of the congregation
W. Goode, Seminar on Church Discipline 26 (May 16, 1981) (unpublished manuscript availa-
ble from Faith Baptist Counseling Ministries, Faith Baptist Church, Lafayette, Indiana, pro-
viding a Baptist view of this subject). For a Congregational view of the subject, see D. WRAY,
BIBLICAL CHURCH DISCIPLINE (1978). For a Mennonite view, see M. TESCHKE, DISCIPLINING
THE BROTHER (1972).
2. "In the law of libel and slander, [a qualified privilege is] the same as conditional
privilege. 'Absolute privilege' renders defendant absolutely immune from civil liability for his
defamatory statements, while 'qualified privilege' protects defendant from liability only if he
uttered defamatory statements without actual malice." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1117 (5th
ed. 1979), citing Martinez v. Cardwell, 25 Ariz. App. 253, 542 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1975).
3. "One who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for defa-
mation if the statement is true." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977).
4. No. CT-81-929 (Dist. Ct. in and for Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma, March 1984),
appeal docketed, No. 62154 (Okla. Sup. Ct., Jan. 1985).
5. Ranii, Church Discipline Goes to Court, 7 NAT'L L.J. 30 (1985).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 100-01.
7. Cases involving similar actions include: Church of Christ, Garden Grove, California;
Church of Christ, Memphis, Tennessee; Christian Community Church, Santa Clara, Califor-
nia; Christian Community Church, San Jose, California; and Central Baptist Church, Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania.
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claims with allegations of tortious invasion of privacy. 8 As a result, the
churches' first amendment freedoms of religion are under attack.'
Just how far courts should go to protect the right of privacy is the vital
issue involved in church discipline cases. Church discipline is a procedure
whereby churches deal with members who violate the church's moral
code. 10 This procedure involves confronting, reproving, and ultimately ex-
cluding persons from the church when necessary. In the process, private
facts about the offending party's conduct may be disclosed." The tort ac-
tion for invasion of privacy exists to protect an individual's peace of mind
which includes the right not to have private embarrassing facts published
even if such facts are true. 2 For a church to publish private information
during church discipline proceedings is therefore an invasion of privacy, but
arguably, the free exercise of religion would dictate that such church disci-
pline communications must be protected.
An examination of the reasons why church discipline proceedings de-
serve greater protection than currently afforded under the tort law of pri-
vacy must begin with an historical review of the procedure of church disci-
pline as a religious practice, followed by an analysis of church discipline
procedure as its relates to the law. Then, a review of the Guinn case will
illustrate the inadequacies of privacy law to protect the church's first
amendment freedoms of religion. Finally, this note will consider four possi-
ble resolutions to restore a level of adequate protection.
J. McGoldrick, Jr., Marian Guinn v. The Collinsville, Oklahoma Church of Christ 8, 9 (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript). See Ranii, supra note 5, at 30 (Ranii notes that the Guinn decision
has been a catalyst for filing new church discipline cases across the country). See also Jane
Murray v. The Church of Christ Northside, No. 15420 (In the Dist. Ct. Val Verde County
Texas, July 1985) (settled out of court).
It should be noted at this point that the legal issues involved in church discipline litigation
closely parallel the issues raised by lawsuits involving spiritual counselors and clergymen.
Therefore, although the discussion in this note is limited to church discipline cases, the ramifi-
cations of such lawsuits will have a much broader impact on the overall area of church-state
relations. See generally Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16
VAL. U.L. REV. 163 (1981); Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual
Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free Exercise"?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1296 (1986).
8. See infra note 66.
9. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment
clause applied to the states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise
applied to the states).
10. See supra note 1.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 22-23.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 77-81.
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An individual, upon joining a religious association, does so with an im-
plied consent to be bound by the procedures governing that association.'"
He thereby limits his own freedom in exchange for the benefits derived
from becoming a part of a religious body. Church discipline is a governing
procedure used by some churches to deal with members who violate the
church's moral code. Therefore, when church discipline is exercised, the
church is merely requiring the offending party to abide by the doctrine that
governs the entire congregation.'
4
Churches exercise public church discipline, including exclusion of per-
sons from the congregation, for private as well as public offenses'" that
threaten to jeopardize the church's ministry to the surrounding commu-
nity. 6 The actual exclusion of a person from the congregation is never for
the person's initial failure to conform to the church's moral code. Rather,
exclusion results when the offending party, following the offense, refuses to
alter his behavior to bring his conduct back into conformance with the
church's code.' 7 In the case of a public offense, a person's failure to reform
his behavior and publicly admit his misconduct before the congregation
triggers exclusion.18
The doctrinal basis for church discipline procedure is found in the
Bible.' 9 Three distinct steps are involved. 0 The first step begins when a
member offends another member by conduct contrary to the church's moral
code. The party who was offended is responsible for going to the offending
party privately and confronting him about his offensive behavior. Such a
confrontation should involve a clear violation of the church's moral code,
not merely an incidental or speculative matter. The purpose of this confron-
tation is to bring about a change in conduct on the part of the offending
member, such that he again conforms to the moral code of the church. If
the offensive conduct is stopped, no justification exists for making the of-
13. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 666, 676 (1871) (implied consent to submit
to ecclesiastical government upon joining). See infra text accompanying note 36.
14. "It is the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals
for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding
in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself
provides for." Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 676-77.
15. Generally the procedure of church discipline begins with a private offense but results
in disclosure of the misconduct to the entire congregation when necessary. Goode, supra note
1, at 24.
16. When churches do not solve problems they will not be perceived as being effective in
serving their community, and they will not prosper. See id. at 5.
17. Id. at 10.
18. Id. at 24. See infra text accompanying note 30.
19. Matthew 18:15-17.
20. See generally Goode, supra note 1, at 20-24.
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fense known to other members of the congregation. Depending upon the
offending member's response, the party who is offended can repeat this step
numerous times before additional steps are taken.
The party who is offended initiates the second step only upon a failure
by the offending party to respond to the private confrontation in step one.
Step two involves confronting the offending party semi-privately with one or
two other members of the church. The purpose behind step two is to solicit
the aid of other members to bring about the desired change in behavior in
the offending member. As with step one, nothing limits the second step to a
single visit or meeting. The small group confronting the offending party
may attempt several times to bring about the desired behavioral change.
At this stage of the procedure, the group of two or three members will
generally remind the offending member that the entire congregation will be
informed upon a failure by the offending party to respond and change his
conduct. This communication allows the offending member an opportunity
to deal with the problem prior to disclosure to the congregation. Although,
it is true that the offending party has no other option but to alter his behav-
ior in order for the matter to remain private, that individual has agreed to
abide by the church's doctrine when he joined the congregation. 1
Church doctrine does not merely recommend this second step but
rather requires it as a duty.2 Once the member who was offended has initi-
ated the procedure, he has a duty to follow through with each step for the
benefit of the offending party, as well as the entire congregation. If neces-
sary, the group must proceed to step three.
Step three is the final step in the church discipline procedure and is
only necessary when steps one and two have failed. This final step involves
notifying the congregation of the offensive conduct and if necessary later
voting to exclude the offending party from the religious body. The initial
reason for telling the congregation is to enlist the aid of the church in order
to bring about the desired change in conduct in the offending party. Gener-
ally, the church leadership will inform the congregation that some offensive
conduct, contrary to the church's doctrinal code, has occurred. The leader-
ship will allow a period of time, usually a week or more, for individual
members of the congregation to use whatever influence they might have to
confront the offending party.
Assuming that no change in conduct results, the church leadership will
make a second announcement, prior to voting by the governing body, to
exclude the violating party. The purpose of the second announcement is to
disclose sufficient details with regard to the offending party's conduct in
21. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wail.) 666, 676 (1871).
22. Goode, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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order to make clear to the congregation that a violation of the church's
moral code has in fact taken place."3 Following this disclosure, the congre-
gation will vote on whether or not to exclude the offending party from the
church until such time as that party changes his conduct to conform with
the church's doctrinal code.2' Upon exclusion, if such a change occurs, the
church must receive that person back into the congregation if the excluded
party so desires.2 5
Several important matters need highlighting with regard to the church
discipline procedure. First, the offending party is not given the option sim-
ply to "quit" the congregation at any point in the procedure.2 The church
acting through one member, then a small group, and finally as an entire
congregation has no basis for setting aside the doctrinal procedure simply
because an offending party chooses to avoid the consequences of the disci-
pline process. To allow such an option would undermine the duty involved.
The congregation has a duty not to curtail the process of restoring the of-
fending member short of providing that individual every opportunity to
change his conduct prior to exclusion.
Secondly, making a critical doctrinal distinction is important with re-
gard to membership. Many churches espouse the religious belief that when
a person becomes a Christian, that person is spiritually incorporated into
the Body of Christ.2" As such, he becomes a member of "The Church"
23. Goode, supra note 1, at 1-2. General precautions taken at this point in the procedure
include:
l)No matter will be disclosed unless prior steps have been followed.
2)No information should be disclosed unnecessarily, only what is necessary to the congre-
gational action.
3)No information concerning parties not under discussion should be heard.
4)No member may be excluded where genuine evidence of change is found. Id. at 24, 33.
24. Goode, supra note 1, at 24, 33.
[lindividuals functioning in an interdependent society need to be informed about
those with whom they interact (even when information comes from non-family members
or from those without other special relationships). They need this information at least as
much as they need to know of the character of public officials and public figures.
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 915, 941 (1978) (citation omitted). See also H. ROBERTS, ROBERTS RULES OF ORDER
REVISED 303, 304 (1971) (voting procedures).
25. Goode, supra note 1, at 24, 33.
26. Goode, supra note 1, at 23. The congregation has a duty to consistently apply disci-
pline procedures so that each member is given the same fair treatment. To abandon church
discipline procedures once initiated because the member "quits" would be contrary to the goal
of restoration and would undermine the effectiveness of disciplining a member.
27. 1 Corinthians 12:12-27.
Withdrawal of fellowship is different from withdrawal of a member. The appellant
church teaches the belief that once a person becomes a member, that person cannot with-
draw his or her membership (T. 376/I1). As in a family, once a person is born into a
family, the person remains a member for life. The church has no provision for expulsion
1987]
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which includes all Christians both living and dead. This membership is sep-
arate and distinct from joining a local church congregation. The process of
church discipline is not aimed at a person's membership in "The Church,"
and in fact, when the congregation disciplines a person, it still considers
such an individual to be a Christian, although the group has excluded him
from their number. This explains why a local church must admit a person
back into the congregation when there is a sincere change in conduct fol-
lowing exclusion. 28 Because of this doctrinal distinction, many church
groups would refer to the exclusion from membership resulting from disci-
pline as "dis-fellowshipping. 29
Finally, one exception to the three-step procedure outlined above is the
requirement that offenses which are committed publicly must be dealt with
publicly.8 0 Normally, churches will tend to use the three-step procedure
whenever possible so as to avoid exposing faults unnecessarily, even in cases
where the church receives rumors and complaints about the offending mem-
ber's conduct from non-church members in the community. 3' The preceding
review of church discipline, as a religious practice, lays the foundation for
examining this church doctrinal practice as its relates to the law.
III. CHURCH DISCIPLINE AS IT RELATES TO THE LAW
Tort law and constitutional law interact in a delicate balance to protect
the first amendment freedoms of religion involved in church discipline prac-
tice. Changes in tort law have altered that balance and created a legal envi-
ronment which is far less protective of this vital church government proce-
dure. Legal issues of subject matter jurisdiction, defamation law, invasion
of privacy, the state action doctrine, and the religion clauses of the first
amendment are all pertinent to understanding suits arising out of church
(T. 377/12).
Brief for Appellant at 5, The Church of Christ of Collinsville, Oklahoma v. Marian Guinn,
No. 62154 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1985). [hereinafter Brief-A].
28. Goode, supra note i, at 24, 33 (the goal after exclusion is still restoration).
29. Brief-A, supra note 27, at 5.
30. Goode, supra note 1, at 24. See also Galatians 2:11-14. The local church govern-
ment itself decides when an offense is public. Examples of public offenses would be public
drunkenness or incarceration for shoplifting. See Goode, supra note I, at 9.
31. Goode, supra note I, at 24. Marian Guinn acknowledged at trial that her affair was
rumored around the small town (T. 147/22-24). Brief-A, supra note 27, at 8-9. With regard to
the requirements for a violation of privacy, "the facts disclosed to the public must be private
facts, and not public ones. Certainly no one can complain when publicity is given to informa-
tion about him which he himself leaves open to the public eye." Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 394 (1960). Contra Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 960
(1968) (author notes that some privacy cases allow the defendant to incur liability for disclos-
ing to a larger segment of the public that which was already known to a smaller public
segment).




A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As early as 1871, the United States Supreme Court declared that civil
courts may not exercise jurisdiction where the subject matter of a dispute
was strictly "ecclesiastical in nature."32 The Court, in Watson v. Jones, s3
defined the phrase "ecclesiastical in nature" to mean a matter concerning
"theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the
conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required
of them."' 34 The Court's underlying rationale was that the inquiry by civil
courts into such matters would require excessive and impermissible govern-
ment entanglement with religion.8 5 Furthermore, the Court noted that per-
32. [I]t is a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and purely
ecclesiastical in its character-a matter over which the civil courts exercise no jurisdic-
tion-a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical
government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals
required of them-becomes the subject of its action. It may be said here, also, that no
jurisdiction has been conferred on the tribunal to try the particular case before it, or that,
in its judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that the laws of the church do
not authorize the particular form of proceeding adopted; and, in a sense often used in the
courts, all of those may be said to be questions of jurisdiction. But it is easy to see that if
the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal
theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of
every religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care,
for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the
ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court.




[T]he form of entanglement the Supreme Court deems most subversive of first
amendment values is that which involves government not only in the apparatus of religion
but in its very spirit-in its decisions on core matters of belief and ritual. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recognized long ago that it 'would lead to the total subversion of ...
religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular
courts and have them reversed.' Thus, American courts-both state and federal-have
uniformly held that, 'in matters purely religious or ecclesiastical, the civil courts have no
jurisdiction' and have uniformly recognized that religious freedom 'would not long sur-
vive' if church members unsatisfied about 'some matter of religious faith or church polity,
could successfully appeal to the secular courts for redress.'
Only in part do such pronouncements reflect a desire to preserve the autonomy and
self-government of religious organizations; even more deeply, they reflect a conviction
that government must never take sides on religious matters, a conviction 'requiring on the
part of all organs of government a strict neutrality toward theological questions.' At the
very heart of first amendment theory is the proposition that '[t]he law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.' It follows
that the most clearly forbidden entanglement between church and state is the entangle-
ment that occurs when institutions of civil government attempt to discover religious error
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sons who unite with a church do so with implied consent to submit to and
be bound by the church's governing body."
The principle of prohibiting court jurisdiction for ecclesiastical matters
arose out of disputes among members over church property.3 7 Even in a
church property dispute, the Court has held that the decision of the church
tribunal is conclusive where questions of religious doctrine and practice are
involved in resolving the case.38 In later decisions, the Court has allowed
civil courts to apply neutral principles of law to resolve church property
disputes where the court was not forced to decide questions of doctrine or
practice in the process.8 9
A series of cases has affirmed the general principle that civil courts are
forbidden from deciding ecclesiastical questions.4 The Court more recently
applied this principle in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivozevich.4'
Milivozevich involved a dispute over church government control of a dio-
cese. The Court held that the Illinois Supreme Court had unconstitutionally
interfered with religious freedom by interposing its judgment into ecclesias-
tical matters.4 2 However, the prohibition against deciding ecclesiastical is-
sues is not absolute. On very rare occasions involving church doctrinal mat-
ters, the Court has declared illegal certain conduct based on religious
by legal process, or to promulgate religious truth by legal decree.
L. TRIBE., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 870-71 (1978) (citation omitted).
36. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 676.
37. See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (af-
firming the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court
inquiry).
38. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 678. In this church property dispute, the Court de-
ferred to the religious tribunal to avoid deciding theological doctrinal matters.
39. "Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to
disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use
in all property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property
is awarded." Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). See also Jones v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (affirming the "neutral principles" of property law rule). Com-
menting on Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church:
Secular authorities may not resolve civil disputes that engage them 'in the forbidden
process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine.' [Presbyterian, 393 U.S. at 4511.
Once it is conceded that first amendment values are unacceptably compromised
when civil courts undertake to settle religious issues, it becomes clear that allowing a
legal determination about property or some other secular matter to turn on a court's
answer to a religious question represents a path fraught with peril: that path is one along
which unsatisfied former believers could drag the civil courts into the theological
thicket. ...
L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 874-75.
40. See, e.g., Presbyterian, 393 U.S. at 449; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 243 (1963). All organs of government should follow a strict neutrality toward theo-
logical questions. Id.
41. Milivozevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
42. Id. at 696.
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beliefs.4" In each case the state raised an overriding interest to warrant gov-
ernment interference."
In recent cases of church discipline,45 state courts have not agreed as to
whether the general principal in Watson, prohibiting civil courts from as-
suming jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters, including church discipline,
should preclude jurisdiction where significant personal rights are in the bal-
ance, and government appears to be simply providing a forum to resolve
such disputes. 4' The common law did not provide churches with an absolute
immunity from tortious actions involving religious communications during
church discipline proceedings. 47 Even though civil courts have historically
assumed jurisdiction over church related questions involving personal rights
under tort law, until recently the common law precluded from adjudication
the kind of actions currently being raised in state courts.48 A comparison of
defamation law and tortious invasion of privacy, as each relates to church
discipline communications, will demonstrate why this statement is true.
B. Causes of Action Utilized in Church Discipline Suits
Developments in tort law have created a framework very different from
43. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986) (requiring an American Indian to
furnish a social security number in order to receive AFDC benefits); Goldman v. Weinberger,
106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) (ordering an orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi not to wear a yarmulke
while on duty and in uniform as a commissioned officer in the Air Force); Bob Jones Univer-
sity v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying tax exempt status to a racially restrictive
religious school); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (refusing to exempt Amish em-
ployers from paying social security taxes); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(outlawing polygamy).
44. The First Amendment Language that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise . . .' historically has stood for
the strict prohibition of governmental interference in ecclesiastical matters. Only on rare
occasions where there existed a compelling governmental interest in the regulation of
public health, safety, and general welfare have the courts ventured into this protected
area. Such incursions have been cautiously made so as not to interfere with the doctrinal
beliefs and internal decisions of the religious society. Thus, the law is clear: civil courts
are barred by the First Amendment from determining ecclesiastical questions.
Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).
45. See, e.g., Chavis v. Rowe, 93 N.J. 103, 459 A.2d 674, 679 (1983). Chavis involved
church discipline of a deacon. The court held that civil court scrutiny of Biblical injunctions
was beyond the authority of the court. "[lI]nsinuations by civil courts into the customs and
usages of the by-laws and the constitution, into the administration and the polity of the church
in the hope of uncovering clues to the correct disciplinary procedures, threatens the freedom of
religious institutions from secular entanglement." Id.; Marian Guinn v. The Church of Christ
of Collinsville, Oklahoma, No. Ct-81-929 (Dist. Ct. in and for Tulsa County, State of
Oklahoma, March 1984) (plaintiff wins on the merits $390,000).
46. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 55-58.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 55-61.
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the traditional common law, '49 where church discipline proceedings were ac-
tionable under a defamation theory only upon a showing of malice. The
only protections afforded defamatory church discipline communications
were common law defenses and privileges. 1 Upon removing such protec-
tions, speech that occurs in the course of church discipline will not be
shielded from liability. 2
1. Defamation Law
Through the development of the law of defamation, various privileges
and defenses evolved which shield churches from suit when involved in dis-
ciplinary proceedings including a conditional privilege, 53 as well as an abso-
lute defense of truth.5 4 A qualified privilege protects communications which
arise from spiritual and moral obligations and which church rules authorize
or even require.5 5 The privilege applies to members as well as to ministers
and to officers" and generally requires that the defendant make good-faith
statements.5 7 A showing on the part of the plaintiff that such communica-
tions were made with malice removes the privilege and makes the defama-
tory words actionable. 8
49. Under the common law, actions against church discipline communications arose
under the law of defamation. Defamation: "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559
(1977). "The meaning of a communication is that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly
but reasonably understands that it was intended to express." Id. at § 563.
50. 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel and Slander §§ 208-209 (1970).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 581A(d), 596(e) (1977) (Truth Defense &
Qualified Privilege: Common Interest). See also 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander §§ 208-
209 (1970); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 830, n.57 (W.
Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
52. See infra text accompanying note 100.
53. See supra notes 2, 51.
54. See supra note 51.
55. § 208. Religious and church matters.
It is firmly established that conditional privilege attaches to communications be-
tween church members and authorities in respect of organizational and administrative
matters, and as to church matters which are of mutual interest and concern, or which are
authorized or required by church rules....
50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 208 (1970) (citation omitted).
§ 209. Expulsion and disciplinary proceedings.
Conditional privilege as to statements made during the course of disciplinary and
expulsion proceedings of course has its limitations, and in some cases such statements are
actionable. To be privileged, the communication must have been made pursuant to a
duty....
Id. at § 209 (citation omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id. (good faith-believing his statements to be true).
58. Malice vitiates any privilege existing with respect to expulsion or disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Such malice has been said to consist in motivation by any cause other than the
desire to carry out church discipline in good faith, or, according to some cases, in the use
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 [1987], Art. 7
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Thus, a common law qualified privilege meant that the church or its
members accused of defamation would not be liable without a showing of
malice." Malice has proven to be a very difficult standard to define." ° As
applied to defamatory speech, malice generally means publishing the false
statement in a wrong state of mind."' Whether defined as wrong motive, ill
will, or something else, in conjunction with a defense of truth, malice has
proven to be an adequate protection against church discipline litigation in
the past.
The constitutional holdings in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,6 2 and Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,63 have modified this strict
common law approach.6 Common law malice is no longer treated as suffi-
cient to constitute abuse of a conditional privilege. Instead, knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of truth is necessary for this purpose. 5 So, for a
false statement the standard under a qualified privilege is actual malice.
This constitutional standard affords speech a slightly greater protection
than under the malice standard of common law. Courts might never apply
this actual malice standard, however, because the tort action for invasion of
privacy is supplanting defamation law.
2. Invasion of Privacy
Invasion of privacy is replacing defamation as the cause of action in
many claims including church discipline.6 Critical, therefore, are the paral-
of expulsion proceedings as a pretense. In some cases it is shown by proof of hatred or ill
will toward the plaintiff, or of an intent to injure him in his profession or to injure his
feelings and reputation. Also, it may be shown by overdrawing, exaggerating, or coloring
the facts in the charges and by failure to state them fully and fairly.
50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 209 (1970) (citation omitted). See First Baptist Church
of Glen Este v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (church discipline in bad faith
may be subject to civil court inquiry). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
580B(l), 596(b), and Special Note prior to § 593 (1977). The Restatement assumes that
publishing a statement with lack of reasonable ground to believe in its truth, one of the ways
of showing abuse of privilege or common law malice, is equivalent to negligence. Id. See infra
text accompanying notes 59-61. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, at
833-35 (for general discussion of malice standard).
59. See supra notes 51 (Qualified Privilege), 58.
60. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, at 833-35 (discussing the
concept of common law malice).
61. Id. at 833.
62. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
63. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 596(b) (e), 600 (1977).
65. Id. See supra note 58.
66. . . . Dean Wade, following up a Prosser suggestion, .... argued that privacy now
overlaps defamation to a significant degree, and predicted that we may well see the right
of privacy gradually replace the torts of libel and slander, a development of the law he
would applaud.
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lels and important distinctions in this relatively new tort field as compared
with defamation law. To understand privacy law as it exists today, espe-
cially in relation to church discipline, will require examination of its evolu-
tion in the common law6" as well as analysis of the constitutional holdings
of the United States Supreme Court on this subject.68
Invasion of privacy evolved fairly recently as a tort action in the com-
mon law when compared to defamation.69 At its inception, invasion of pri-
vacy focused on defamatory speech in the news media70 that disclosed pri-
vate facts.7" Later, Prosser defined invasion of privacy as it subsequently
developed into four distinct and separate claims.72 The four categories in-
clude: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude or into his pri-
vate affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
The mysterious way in which the common law grows and changes has never found
better illustration than in the current tendency of privacy actions to move into the tradi-
tional field of defamation. Warren and Brandeis, despite their tributes to the 'eternal
youth of the common law,' would have been astonished to learn that the precedent they
launched would grow so that today, in Dean Wade's wording, 'the great majority of defa-
mation actions can now be brought for the invasion of the right of privacy.
Dean Wade further argues that use of privacy permits defamation at last to recover
from what Pollock called 'its going wrong at the outset,' that is, treating the matter as
injury to reputation rather than to feelings; that it permits the use of a 'negligence
calculus' structure rather than the rigid prima facie case-privilege structure of defama-
tion; that it permits escape from the arbitrariness of the libel-slander distinction; and that
it will permit a more flexible and candid appraisal of the free-speech issues involved in
defamation cases ...
But if the colonization of defamation by privacy does take place, it will only be because
by the use of a fiction the courts have turned at last to the reform of the law of defama-
tion. It will not be because they have perceived that logically defamation is subsumed in
privacy. They will simply be calling false statements by a new name.
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326, 328, 339, 341 (1966) (citing Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960);
Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1962)) (citation
omitted).
67. See infra text accompanying note 69-73.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 85-98.
69. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
Pavesich was the leading case in the development of the right to privacy. Prosser, supra note
31, at 386.
70. Kalven alludes to the fact that privacy developed around the disclosure of private
facts to the news media. Kalven, supra note 66, at 333. Only recently has the action grown to
include non-media disclosures. See infra note 98.
71. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The
Warren and Brandeis article arose out of personal annoyance from the press. Id.
72. Prosser, supra note 31, at 389. See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571-72 & nn.7-8 (1977) (the Court relied on Prosser's four branches of
privacy).
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eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs
name or likeness s.7  As related to speech, the claims for tortious invasion of
privacy overlap defamation law.
Though similar to defamation, the new privacy tort should not sup-
plant defamation law. With the introduction of the right of privacy, the
authors of this new tort recommended several limitations to distinguish pri-
vacy actions from defamation claims. 7 4 The most critical limitation related
to speech was that communications, privileged under defamation law, would
not be prohibited under a claim for invasion of privacy. In reality, however,
73. Prosser, supra note 31, at 389.
74. Warren and Brandeis recommended the following guidelines:
I) Privacy would not prohibit publication of matter of general or public interest.
2) Privacy would not prohibit communications rendered privileged under the law of slan-
der and libel.
3) No redress would be available for invasion of privacy by oral publication in the ab-
sence of special damages.
4) The right of privacy ceases upon publication of the facts by the individual, or with his
consent.
5) Truth is no defense.
6) Absence of malice is no defense.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 97, at 214-19. See also Prosser, supra note 31, at 383-84
(recognizing Warren and Brandeis as co-authors of the new tort).
• . . [T]he public disclosure of an embarrassing private fact should be without first
amendment protection only if the disclosure is embarrassing but not defamatory. If a
disclosure adversely affects the subject's reputation, then the policy reasons which support
the right of speech when reputations are attacked outweigh the privacy consideration.
Moreover, if a particular statement not only constitutes an invasion of privacy but
also injures the subject's reputation and is therefore prima facie defamatory (subject to
the defense of truth), then the Times definitional balance for defamation should be appli-
cable. If the first amendment protects such defamatory statements, the right to make
them may not be abridged under state law even if the state law gives a 'privacy' rather
than a 'defamation' label to such abridgment. As 'libel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations,' neither can the talisman of 'privacy' vitiate the constitu-
tional protection for speech values contained in defamatory speech, even if that same
speech also invades privacy. This may seem to lead to an odd result. That is, one may
obtain judicial redress if a statement merely invades one's privacy, but if it goes farther
and both invades privacy and is detrimental to reputation, then (at least if one is a public
figure) he may be precluded by the first amendment from a judicial remedy. But such a
result is not so odd as might at first appear. If a reputation-injuring statement contains
speech values not to be found in a privacy-invading statement, those values remain even if
the statement combines reputation injuring and privacy-invading elements. The defense
of such values justifies weighing the definitional balance so as to afford first amendment
protection where the speech combines both such elements.
Nimmer, supra note 31, at 960, 964-65 (citation omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the Warren and Brandeis limitation to privacy as applied to communications rendered
privileged under slander and libel. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493 (1975).
See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, at 868.
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actions for invasion of privacy are replacing defamation claims.7
Claims for invasion of privacy are supplanting defamation claims
largely because courts are not applying, to suits for invasion of privacy, the
protections for speech which developed within the law of defamation. 76
There are at least two reasons courts are reluctant to apply defamation
protections to privacy actions affecting speech. First, unlike defamation,
which protects a person's reputation, 77 the right to privacy as it involves
speech primarily aims at protecting a person's right not to have private in-
formation disclosed whether or not that information is defamatory and
whether or not that information is true.78 Actions for privacy protect the
individual's peace of mind, not just his reputation 7  and unlike defamation
the injury from an invasion of privacy arises from the mere publication
which more speech will not remedy.80 Therefore, courts are not automati-
cally applying traditional defamation privileges and defenses to correspond-
ing privacy claims. 81
75. See infra text accompanying notes 76-82.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82.
77. See supra note 49.
78. Nimmer, supra note 31, at 958. Injury from invasion of privacy arises from mere
publication, and further speech cannot remedy the injury. Id. at 961.
79. Beginning with Sir Frederick Pollock, a number of authors and scholars have agreed
that "the law of defamation went wrong from the beginning in making the damage and not the
insult the cause of action." F. POLLOCK, TORTS 181 (15th ed. 1951). See Wade, infra note 82.
Such persons see the supplanting of defamation by privacy as rectifying that problem because
of the focus of privacy on protection of a person's feelings (and general peace of mind) as
opposed to reputation requiring damage in fact. Id. But see Kalven, supra note 66, at 340-41,
(Kalven criticizes the supplanting of defamation law by privacy and suggests that Pollock was
wrong).
80. Nimmer, supra note 31, at 961.
81. See supra note 79. The same reasoning has produced an unwillingness to apply a
truth defense as well to an action of privacy. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 74. One
minor exception is in the case of a "false light" privacy action where one basic issue is whether
the embarrassing information disclosed was false. Prosser, supra note 31, at 419. Prosser rec-
ognizes that the loss of truth as a defense in privacy is a critical element to holding defendants
liable for entirely accurate statements of true facts. Id. at 422. Accord Munsell v. Ideal Food
Stores, 208 Kan. 909, 494 P.2d 1063, 1073 (1972) (recognizing a truth defense for privacy).
This is perhaps the place to pause to reflect on the rule that truth is a defense in
defamation. Although the rule has considerable venerability, there has been some contro-
versy over its policy in recent years. There have been articles urging that truth as a
defense be qualified, and about ten jurisdictions have by statute made moves in this direc-
tion. What is arresting here is that none of the critics argue for more than a change that
would make truth a defense only if uttered with good motives. If we come at the matter
from the angle of defamation, liability for disclosing a truth about the plaintiff would at
most be actionable only if the defendant published with bad motives. If this is as far as
we have been willing to go in defamation, where the disclosure is negative enough to
injure reputation, why do we expand the liability rule when we come at the grievance as
an invasion of privacy? If privacy were to have been made consistent with the old tort of
defamation, it would have been a stringent form of intentional tort requiring something
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Second, there has been a movement in tort law to see the law of defa-
mation simplified. The introduction of new torts such as privacy and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress has been a convenient avenue to bring
about this change.82 when proving unreasonable or unwarranted invasion of
privacy, conflicting interests, like speech concerns, are open to the court.
The court must see that each interest is given adequate consideration. The
vital interests in freedom of speech, which were safeguarded by some of the
rigid rules of the law of defamation, 83 are now no longer afforded such pro-
tection. The development of the law of privacy has radically departed from
the limits and protections found within the law of defamation8 4 to shield
akin to ill will. Perhaps as Dean Wade suggests it is the old that should conform to the
new; defamation should now be made consistent with privacy. But in any event the
strained relationship of truth in privacy to truth in defamation is one more indication that
the law has been oddly indifferent to working out any serious definition of the newer tort.
Kalven, supra note 66, at 335 (citation omitted).
82. [T]he great majority of defamation actions can now be brought for invasion of the
right of privacy and . . . many of the restrictions and limitations of libel and slander can
be avoided.
* * . The penetration of the law of privacy into this field affords a splendid opportunity
for reform of the traditional law regarding the actionability of language which harms an
individual's peace of mind or his reputation.
. . . If the law of privacy then absorbs the law of defamation, it will merely afford a
complete 'unfolding' of the idea or principle behind that law. Indeed, there is a real
reason to conclude that the principle behind the law of privacy is much broader than the
idea of privacy itself, and that the whole law of privacy will become a part of the larger
tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering. That tort would then absorb established
torts like assault and defamation and invasion of the right of privacy and join them to-
gether with other innominate torts to constitute a single, integrated system of protecting
plaintiff's peace of mind against acts of the defendant intended to disturb it.
Wade, supra note 66, at 1121-22, 1124-25. Kalven is extremely critical of Mr. Wade's analy-
sis and the action for privacy in general. He contends that applying the qualified privileges of
defamation law to privacy as recommended by Warren and Brandeis and others would all but
eliminate the action for invasion of privacy for disclosure of private facts. Kalven, supra note
66, at 335 n.56, 336-37, 341.
83. Wade contends that using a "negligence approach" (negligence calculus) as opposed
to a system of qualified privileges is appropriate. He sees this as a way to avoid the confusion
of defamation law. He argues that when first amendment freedoms (especially speech) are
weighed in the balance against privacy interests, those freedoms will be adequately protected.
In order to support his argument, he warns that special care needs to be given to protecting
speech interests, and he suggests that the court decide this matter as a question of law to
assure proper and adequate protection. Wade, supra note 66, at 1113-15, 1122-24.
84. Prosser, concerned over what he observed happening, gave a strong warning:
It is evident from the foregoing that, by the use of a single word supplied by Warren
and Brandeis, the courts have created an independent basis of liability, which is a com-
plex of four distinct and only loosely related torts; and that this has been expanded by
slow degrees to invade, overlap, and encroach upon a number of other fields. So far as
appears from the decisions, the process has gone on without any plan, without much
realization of what is happening or its significance, and without any consideration of its
dangers. They are nonetheless sufficiently obvious, and not to be overlooked.
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what society has considered valuable speech. The result is that mere negli-
gence is becoming the standard for tort liability in actions involving speech.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to define the constitutional
limits of protection for speech as it occurs in tortious invasion of privacy
actions. The extent to which the New York Times v. Sullivan,85 Gertz, and
Dun and Bradstreet holdings apply to privacy actions is far from clear.
Prior to Gertz, the Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill86 applied the actual malice
standard of New York Times to a privacy action involving the publication
of an erroneous but not defamatory report about a private family involved
in a newsworthy incident.87 The Court in Hill specifically noted that "[t]he
risk of such exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places
a primary value on freedom of speech and press." 88 Therefore, the constitu-
tional protections for speech are the basis on which the Court required a
showing of actual malice in this "false light" privacy action.89
Later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,9O the Court held that the
New York Times standard must be applied to all defamatory statements of
general or public interest. The Court in Gertz repudiated this idea, how-
ever, drawing a distinction between public and private plaintiffs, and requir-
One cannot fail to be aware, in reading privacy cases, of the extent to which de-
fenses, limitations and safeguards established for the protection of the defendant in other
tort fields have been jettisoned, disregarded, or ignored. Taking intrusion first, the gist of
the wrong is clearly the intentional infliction of mental distress, which is now in itself a
recognized basis of tort liability. Where such mental disturbance stands on its own feet,
the courts have insisted upon extreme outrage, rejecting all liability for trivialities, and
upon genuine and serious mental harm, attested by physical illness, or by the circum-
stances of the case. But once 'privacy' gets into the picture, and the fact of intrusion is
added, such guarantees apparently are no longer required. No doubt the cases thus far
have been sufficiently extreme; but the question may well be raised whether there are not
some limits, and whether, for example, a lady who insists upon sun-bathing in the nude in
her own back yard should really have a cause of action for her humiliation when the
neighbors examine her with appreciation and binoculars.
The public disclosure of private facts, and putting the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye, both concern the interest in reputation, and move into the field occupied by
defamation. Here, as a result of some centuries of conflict, there have been jealous safe-
guards thrown about the freedom of speech and of the press, which are now turned on the
left flank. Gone is the defense of truth, and the defendant is held liable for the publica-
tion of entirely accurate statements of fact, without any wrongful motive . . . it is high
time that we realize what we are doing, and give some consideration to the question of
where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt.
Prosser, supra note 31, at 422-23 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
85. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
87. Id. at 384-86. (this privacy action was a "false light" action).
88. Id. at 388.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
90. 403 U.S. 29, 43, 44 (1971). Some states including Indiana reject Gertz and follow
Rosenbloom for private plaintiffs.
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ing a lesser standard of proof for private plaintiffs even when the publica-
tion is of general public concern.91 Dun & Bradstreet advanced this trend
when the Court held that a showing of less than actual malice would suffice
for a private individual when the speech involved was not of public con-
cern. 92 Therefore, in spite of the holding in Hill, it would now be reasonable
to assume that negligence would be the standard of proof in a "false light"
privacy action brought by a private plaintiff.93
The Supreme Court has yet to define what constitutional limits the
first amendment places on the violation of the plaintiff's privacy by the ac-
curate disclosure of embarrassing private facts. In Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn," the Court held that accurate disclosure of information, previously
released to the public in official court records, did not constitute an actiona-
ble privacy claim. 95 The Court emphasized, however, that it was not decid-
ing the issue of whether similar disclosure of facts not previously released
would be actionable." Much more important, both Hill and Cohn involved
media defendants, not church officers and congregations. 97 Only recently
have plaintiffs raised privacy claims against private non-media
defendants. 9a
The lack of definition in the privacy tort 9 and the reluctance to carry
over speech protections from defamation law, in spite of warnings to do so
even by strong proponents of the new privacy actions, 100 have created a
unique situation. A framework of legal principles now exists wherein a pri-
vate defendant without any wrongful motive can be held liable for simply
publishing accurate statements of embarrassing facts during a church disci-
pline proceeding. The plaintiff need only prove negligence. Under defama-
91. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346, 348-50 (1974).
92. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946 (1985).
93. This would be an application of Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet to privacy. However, in
Gertz the Court specifically declined to decide this question, so Hill remains good law. Gertz,
418 U.S. at 348.
94. 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (involved broadcasting the name of a rape victim already
released through court records to the public).
95. Id. at 496.
96. Id. at 491.
97. Id. at 469. See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
98. Whether the Court will use a more or less deferential standard with private non-
media defendants, like churches, is yet an unanswered question.
99. Kalven, supra note 66, at 333-39. Kalven in his criticism of privacy as an action
focuses on the lack of definition in general with this tort. He claims there is no definition of
what constitutes a prima facie case, no definition of how damages should be measured, no
definition of whether the basis for liability is limited to intentional invasions, etc. His conclu-
sion is that the application of defamation qualified privileges to privacy actions for disclosure
of private facts would virtually swallow up this new tort, and this gives the proponents for
privacy a strong incentive to argue against applying the privileges. Id.
100. See supra notes 74, 84.
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tion law, a qualified privilege would protect the same statements if false,
and actual malice would be the standard.10' In other words, the church
might be better off to accidentally disclose false information, to which defa-
mation law protections could apply, rather than accurately publishing true
facts. The impact of this inequity in tort law upon first amendment free-
doms is aggravated by the application of other legal principles.
C. State Action
The constitutional law doctrine of state action is based upon the fact
that nearly every freedom guaranteed by the constitution is protected only
against interference by government, not by private individuals.,0 2 For exam-
ple, though the actions of a party adversely affect another's first amend-
ment rights, if no state action is involved, the issue simply is not raised to
the level of a constitutional cause of action. The application of this principle
to church discipline cases is very critical.
The importance of how state action is defined can be seen by the fol-
lowing illustration. Assume that Congress drafted legislation prohibiting the
use of qualified privileges by churches in defamation suits involving church
discipline. Because direct legislative action has proceeded any challenge of
such a law, the governmental involvement required to show state action is
apparent.
Since such legislation would directly impact on first amendment free-
doms of religion,10 3 government must meet the rigid tests established by the
Supreme Court for violating such freedoms in order to validate this stat-
ute.' 04 Some of the more obvious effects of this legislation would be inter-
ference with religious practices,0 5 content-based chilling of religious
speech, 0 6 and a risk of self-censorship by the churches arising out of gov-
101. See supra text accompanying note 65.
102. L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 1147; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 421 (3rd ed. 1986).
103. See supra note 9.
104. The Court outlined a "strict scrutiny" balancing approach for validating govern-
ment actions impacting the free exercise clause of the first amendment. This test requires
government to show a compelling government interest which cannot be accomplished in a man-
ner less restrictive of religious freedom. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court
outlined a "three-prong" test for validating government actions impacting the establishment
clause of the first amendment. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
105. L. TRIBE, supra note 35.
106. "Chilling effect doctrine. In constitutional law, any law or practice which has the
effect of seriously discouraging the exercise of a constitutional right." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 217 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See also D. Baker, The High Cost of Church Discipline, 31
Eternity (magazine) (Sept. 1984). Commenting on Guinn, this religious periodical circulated
among churches that practice church discipline, gave the "chilling" warning: "If ever an accu-
sation is made public, it should be prepared with the help of competent legal counsel. Court
[Vol. 21
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 [1987], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol21/iss2/7
CHURCH DISCIPLINE
ernment determination of what constitutes proper religious association and
doctrine. 10 7 In addition, government would be discriminating against reli-
gious groups that practice church discipline in favor of groups which do not
follow this doctrine. 10 8 Therefore, even a cursory examination indicates that
such government infringement of first amendment freedoms would not
likely be found constitutional.
By extending justiciability to tort actions for invasion of privacy where
defamation common law protections do not apply, the government through
the judicial branch has indirectly produced the same results as the hypo-
thetical legislative act described above. The problem, however, with draw-
ing this comparison is that the state action, so obvious upon congressional
action, is not readily seen with indirect judicial action. The role of the court
in a church discipline case arguably only involves providing a neutral forum
for private parties to resolve disputes, and the necessary state action re-
quired to raise a constitutional cause of action is difficult to show. 0 9 Yet, by
opening a forum to adjudicate previously nonjusticiable matters, the judici-
ary's action has created a conduit for chilling first amendment freedoms,
and such action, like corresponding legislative action, should constitute state
action.
The Supreme Court has recently indicated a reluctance to extend the
action is an ever-increasing possibility." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Prosser alludes to the fact that by allowing privacy to supplant defamation law,
courts are accepting a power of censorship which did not exist under the law of defamation.
He notes that this change is taking place almost without remark. Prosser, supra note 31, at
423.
108. The Court forbids such preference by government as a violation of the establish-
ment clause. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
109. Existence of a state law allowing legitimate action by a private person will not give
rise to "state action" when the private party takes action under the law. There must be some
non-neutral involvement by government in the otherwise private activity. J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 102 at 435. Note: Timing is very critical when the judiciary is
the potential state actor. Tribe notes the fact that common law, particularly defamation and
privacy law, has been recognized by the Supreme Court as state action when applied to a
private dispute in New York Times. See L. TRIBE supra note 35, at 1167-71.
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that the law has been applied
in a civil action and that it is common law only. . . .The test is not the form in which
state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact
been exercised.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (emphasis added). Thus, the same
judicial action which will not likely be recognized as "state action" to preclude church disci-
pline litigation would very likely be found to constitute state action following court action. See
First Baptist Church of Glen Este v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 677 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (where a
federal district court recognized state action by the judiciary following state court
proceedings).
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doctrine of state action. 110 Especially, where the judiciary plays the role of
the state actor, the Court has very narrowly defined the scope of state ac-
tion. In Evans v. Abney,"" the Court found no state action to support a
constitutional claim where the state court simply applied valid state law to
a private trust dispute. 12 Therefore, even though the Court might recognize
state action on the part of the judiciary in church discipline cases, there is
some indication that the Court will not.
D. Freedom of Religion
If the Court were to recognize state action in church discipline cases,
the church would raise constitutional challenges based upon the religion
clauses of the first amendment."18 In Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Schools, Inc.,"" a religious school sought to enjoin state action of
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission by suing in federal court. Even though
the case only involved administrative proceedings, judicial in nature, the
Court assumed state action, 5 but unlike church discipline cases, the state
action involved was pursuant to a state statute." 6 Despite this difference,
the constitutional claims raised in Dayton, based upon the establishment
and free exercise clauses of the first amendment, are strikingly similar to
the constitutional issues in church discipline litigation.' 17 Therefore, an ex-
amination of the analysis involved in evaluating constitutional claims aris-
ing under the religion clauses will illustrate the basis for protecting church
discipline and also emphasize the seriousness of eroding that protection.
1. Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause forbids outlawing any religious belief." 8 Legal
110. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (the Court found no state action
where nursing home transfers, without prior notice or opportunity to be heard, were tightly
circumscribed by state rules); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (the Court found
no state action in the operation of a private school whose income was derived primarily from
public grants).
I11. 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (the Court upheld a state court decision terminating a trust
and allowing land to revert to use for a racially restrictive park).
112. Id. at 439-43.
113. See supra note 9.
114. 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986).
115. Id. at 2719-20.
116. Id.
117. For a thorough analysis of the claims in Dayton, based upon the religion clauses,
see the district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions. 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir.
1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986); 578 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d
932 (6th Cir. 1985).
118. See supra note 9. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment
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problems usually arise not with regard to a belief itself but with conduct in
furtherance of a belief.11 9 State interference can take the form of govern-
ment action which burdens or prohibits conduct required by a religious be-
lief or government action which requires conduct contrary to a belief.12 0
The United States Supreme Court has established strict standards for
determining what constitutes interference with free exercise of religion.
Sherbert v. Verner12 1 illustrates the Court's "strict scrutiny" balancing ap-
proach.' This approach requires the state to show that a compelling gov-
ernment interest is at stake that cannot be accomplished in a manner less
restrictive of religious freedom.128 The Court has designed this standard to
prevent any unnecessary interference with religious free exercise.
Traditionally, the Court has been very protective of religious conduct.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,' 24 for instance, the Court indicated that where sig-
nificant religious freedom is at issue, if granting an exemption will allow the
state to almost fully achieve its goals, then the state should be required to
grant such an exemption, even where the state's interest is otherwise com-
pelling. In fact, only state interests of the highest order can overbalance
has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect.
On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be re-
stricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion. Thus, the Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
Id. See also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 666, 676 (1871).
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice
any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws
of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all.
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establish-
ment of no sect.
Id.
119. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
120. See supra note 43. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting an
exemption to the Amish for compulsory education for their children); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking a regulation requiring a Jehovah Witness
to salute the flag); Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(Jehovah Witness challenges regulation that denies unemployment benefits because he refused
to work in a munitions factory).
121. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (involving a Seventh Day Adventist who was refused unem-
ployment compensation when she was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays; the Court held
this denial unconstitutional).
122. Id. at 406-07.
123. Id.
124. 406 U.S. 205, 215, 236 (1972) (exemption from compulsory education beyond 8th
grade for the Amish).
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legitimate free exercise of religion. 25 In each case, where religious free ex-
ercise was allowed to be so burdened, the state advanced overriding govern-
ment interests in order to justify the interference. 2
The Court's standard can be applied to the competing interests in
church discipline litigation. The state has a legitimate interest in preventing
tortious conduct, including invasions of privacy, by allowing citizens of the
state to bring damage actions based on common law tort claims against
persons or groups that violate individual rights.1 2 7 The counter-balancing
interest involves prevention of a significant interference with conduct in fur-
therance of religious beliefs.12 8 Applying the Sherbert test, the state bears
the burden of showing that its interest is compelling and that no less restric-
tive means are available to avoid interference with sincere religious
practice. 129
The United States Supreme Court has placed a heavy burden upon
any state seeking to infringe freedoms under the first amendment. In West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, s0 the Court held that these free-
doms cannot be infringed on slender grounds but are "susceptible of restric-
tion only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
State may lawfully protect."12 1 Recently, in the area of restrictions on reli-
gious freedoms, the Court has recognized such interests as preventing racial
discrimination in education1 8 2 or sexual discrimination in employment s as
the type of state interests which could warrant burdening religious free ex-
ercise. By contrast, tortious invasion of privacy is not prohibited by federal
statute, and individuals have only recently challenged church disciplinary
procedures.13' More significantly, in both Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States.1 35 and Dayton1 3 6 the Court was dealing with religious schools, not
125. Id. at 215.
126. See Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974) (generally
to be overriding the interest must be a strong health, safety, or welfare interest, and granting
an exemption would significantly impair the government's achievement of its goals).
127. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487, 494-95 (1975).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
129. Id.
130. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
If there is a fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
Id.
131. Id. at 639.
132. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
133. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718
(1986).
134. See supra notes 4, 5 and accompanying text.
135. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 574.
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matters of church administration and government as in the case of church
discipline.
Where religious practices themselves conflict with public interests, the
Court has noted that making accommodation between the religious practice
and state authority is a particularly delicate task. In Braunfeld v. Brown,137
the Court explained that such accommodation must be a chief consideration
because resolution in favor of the state leaves the opposing party a choice of
abandoning a personal religious practice or facing prosecution."'8 Therefore,
as would be the case with church discipline, the Court is reluctant to inter-
fere with religious conduct under such circumstances even when the state
interest is otherwise compelling.
Not only must the state show that the interest of prohibiting the disclo-
sure of private matters within the limited confines of church government is
compelling, the state must further show that the state's interests cannot be
substantially achieved through less drastic means than the permanent pro-
hibition of first amendment rights.139 The very fact that up until recently
churches were protected by common law immunities and defenses indicates
that less drastic alternatives are available. 40 Even where the Court was
dealing with the compelling state interest of prohibiting racial prejudice in
education and the religious party was a school and not a church, the Court
only removed tax benefits, leaving Bob Jones University free to practice its
religious beliefs free of state intervention. 4' Therefore, in church discipline
cases where churches are faced with the options of abandoning their reli-
gious beliefs or practicing them at grave risk of financially disastrous dam-
age claims, 43 the state will be hard pressed to avoid the accommodation
approach of the Supreme Court.
Finally, where a private individual voluntarily joins a religious body,
agreeing to submit to and be protected by that organization's rules and
procedures, to allow such a person to later sue the church, because the rules
were consistently applied to that person in a manner the party believed to
be inappropriate, would be inconsistent with principles laid down by the
136. Dayton, 106 S. Ct. at 2718.
137. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upheld the application of a state Sunday closing law to or-
thodox Jews; the Court distinguished between regulating a secular activity, i.e. being a
merchant on Sunday, and regulating actual religious practices).
138. Id. at 605.
13Q. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23. See also Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940) (overruled in Barnette) ("in safeguarding conscience we are
dealing with interests so subtle and so dear, every possible leeway should be given to the claims
of religious faith").
140. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
141. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983).
142. See infra text accompanying notes 182-83 (example of damages awarded).
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Court." In Watson,24 4 the Court stated that persons who join religious
bodies submit to their authority, voluntarily limiting their personal rights
by joining the assembly. Therefore, the state's interest in protecting individ-
ual rights of privacy in church discipline tort actions, especially where the
person has knowingly waived certain rights upon becoming a church mem-
ber, should give way to or at least accommodate the church's rights to free
exercise.
2. Establishment Clause
Unlike the free exercise clause, the establishment clause does not exist
primarily to guarantee one's right to exercise his beliefs, but rather to guar-
antee that the government will not prefer any one religious denomination or
group at the expense of another. 145 The modern test used by the United
States Supreme Court to evaluate establishment clause claims is a three-
pronged test outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 41 First, the action taken by
the government, whether statutory or otherwise, must have a clear secular
purpose.14 7 Second, the principal or primary effect of the government action
must neither advance nor inhibit religion.148 Finally, the restriction must
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.149
Applying the Lemon test to tort actions raised against church disci-
pline reveals some difficulties with the government restrictions imposed. The
state's interest in preventing tortious invasions of privacy has an obvious
secular purpose. The primary effect, however, of such restrictions on reli-
gious bodies that practice congregational type government is to gravely in-
hibit religious practice. Churches are forced to exercise what they recognize
to be Biblical duties at the risk of excessive tort liability'50 and possibly face
the permanent loss of first amendment rights.' 1 Such a result would effec-
tively be a state punishment of religious practice tending to prefer religious
143. See supra text accompanying note 36. See generally Note, supra note 7, at 1319.
144. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 666, 676 (1871).
145. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
146. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (this case dealt with the issue of supplements to salaries of
teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools. The Court held this to be a viola-
tion of the establishment clause and defined a three-prong test).
147. Id. at 612 (the purpose for the government action must be secular, not religious, or
anti-religious).
148. Id. at 612 (the foremost effect must not be on religion, i.e. impact on religion must
be incidental).
149. Id. at 613 (an example of entanglement would be government having to monitor
the religious activities to assure compliance with some regulation).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 19, 22. See also infra note 183 (one of the
problems with privacy actions supplanting defamation actions is the tendency to award exces-
sive damages). See also Baker supra note 106 (at least as perceived by those who are at risk,
the possibility of liability is increasing).
151. See Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 951-52,
962 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986).
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denominations that do not practice church discipline.'82 Therefore, the pri-
mary effect of the government restriction is a chilling of religious speech
and possible self-censorship among groups which do discipline their
members.18 8
Finally, the government restrictions inherent in church discipline litiga-
tion foster excessive government entanglement with religion. 15 4 In assessing
the entanglement involved in an establishment clause claim, courts look to
several factors: the type of institution being restricted, the nature of the
burden placed upon that institution, and the resulting church-state relation-
ship. 55 In church discipline cases, the institution affected is the church con-
gregation itself which exists for the sole purpose of religious practice.'" The
burden imposed affects the very governance and administration of the local
congregation.' 5" The resulting relationship places the church and state at
odds over determining who is a church member and what duties a congre-
gation has to its members,'" both purely doctrinal matters. The Court has
stated that "[t]he prospect of church and state litigating in court about
what does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of con-
stitutional guarantees against religious establishment."'" Therefore, to
deny churches the right to practice church discipline in good faith without
state intervention fails the Lemon test on two prongs and places the govern-
ment in the prohibited position of preferring certain religious groups over
others.
Thus, analysis under the religion clauses of the first amendment leads
to the conclusion that the current inequitable framework of tort law 6° is a
vehicle for chilling first amendment freedoms of religion. Issues which were
previously barred from civil court jurisdiction are now before the courts.
The Guinn case, on appeal in Oklahoma, is exemplary of the type of litiga-
152. Id. at 949, 952, 962 (this is largely due to the coercive nature of the state interfer-
ence). See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (such punishment and pref-
erences forbidden). See also Brief-A, supra note 27, at 14 (appellants contend that the judg-
ment in Guinn was in fact a punishment of religious practice and serves to "cure" others from
similar exercises). See also Baker, supra note 106, at 30, 31 (interview with S. Ericsson, direc-
tor of the Center for Law and Religious Freedom in Washington D.C., a ministry of the
Christian Legal Society; Commenting on Guinn: "the court in Oklahoma said: conform your
practice or it's going to cost you $390,000").
153. See supra notes 106-07.
154. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
155. Id. at 615.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
157. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 212-15.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35. See also infra text accompanying notes
198-200.
159. See New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977). See also L.
TRIBE, supra note 35.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
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tion that the change in tort law is producing. A close look at Guinn will
illustrate the legal principles at work in church discipline cases.
IV. ANALYZING CHURCH DISCIPLINE ON TRIAL
A. Factual Setting in Guinn
Collinsville Church of Christ is an autonomous church operating under
a congregational type of government with three Elders appointed by the
congregation as overseers.1 61 The church has no written constitution, using
the Bible as the sole authority for faith and practice. 162 Although indepen-
dent, the church maintains close associations with neighboring Churches of
Christ, some of which they helped found. 163 Because of their common inter-
est in deterring member misconduct, the neighboring churches inform one
another of disciplinary proceedings. It is commonplace for an individual at-
tending one local congregation to transfer association to a neighboring
church.' 6
Membership in the Collinsville Church of Christ is accomplished by
joining voluntarily. 65 Becoming a member, also entails acceptance and
practice of the church's moral code, which defines behavior for which disci-
plinary action is taken.' 66 Discipline with regard to sexual misconduct pre-
cipitated the Guinn lawsuit.' 67
Marian Guinn voluntarily joined the Collinsville Church of Christ.'68
She was familiar with the disciplinary procedure of the church and had
witnessed withdrawal of fellowship prior to her own discipline.'" She recog-
nized that sexual misconduct was a disciplinary matter. 7
0
While a member of the church, Guinn allegedly became involved in
sexual misconduct.' 7 As admitted by Guinn, this relationship was rumored
in the town.'"1 The Elders began disciplinary procedures, confronting Guinn
on numerous occasions.' At the point that the Elders informed Guinn that
161. Brief-A, supra note 27, at 2 (T. 368/13), 3 (T. 267/12-19).
162. Id. at 2 (T. 368/15).
163. Id. at 3 (T. 265; T. 264/17; T. 269/23; T. 270/24).
164. Id. at 3 (T 270/21; T. 270/15).
165. Id. at 4 (T. 372/10).
166. Id. at 4, 5 (T. 381/5). See supra notes 13-31 (for description of procedure). The
church uses only the Bible to define its rules and procedures. See infra note 177.
167. Brief-A, supra note 27, at 9 (T. 43/15).
168. Id. at 6 (T. 271/14).
169. Guinn was familiar with the church's rules, and the underlying duties and goals of
discipline, and she had witnessed prior disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 7 (T. 164/7).
170. Id. at 7 (T. 165/7; T. 43/10).
171. Id. at 8 (T. 147/15).
172. Id. at 8 (T. 147/22-24).
173. Id. at 8 (T. 280/4-281/12; T. 173/6).
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failure to alter her behavior would result in disclosure of the misconduct to
the congregation, she contacted an attorney.17" ' The attorney drafted and
mailed a letter to the church threatening legal action if the church pursued
its discipline process, and Guinn sent a letter withdrawing her
membership.'" 6
Having no authority for curtailing their disciplinary procedure, the El-
ders announced to the congregation that Guinn was in violation of the doc-
trinal code. 176 Later, when the congregation's efforts to influence Guinn's
conduct were unsuccessful, the Elders disclosed information regarding the
actual violation prior to the congregation voting to withdraw fellowship. 77
The entire congregation proceeded to vote and withdraw fellowship, and as
was customary, they notified four neighboring churches of the disciplinary
actions.1 7 8
Guinn sued the church and its Elders for defamation.1 7 9 Since the facts
disclosed were true,1 80 the church's actions were shielded by a truth defense
and a qualified privilege, so the complaint was amended. Guinn amended
the complaint to include invasion of privacy claims, both for intrusion into
seclusion and disclosure of private facts, and another claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.181
The case went to trial on the merits of the tort claims. The jury found
the defendants guilty on all three counts.1 82 The court awarded compensa-
tory damages of $205,000 and punitive damages of $185,000.8" The case is
currently on appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court,1 8 and the primary
issues on appeal are claims that the church's constitutional freedoms are
174. Id. at II (T. 93/10).
175. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 198-202.
176. Brief-A, supra note 27, at 11.
177. A letter was read in church identifying and reading the Scriptures violated and the
Scriptures stating the applicable discipline. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 12.
180. Id.
181. Id. See also Brief for Appellee at 10, The Church of Christ of Collinsville,
Oklahoma v. Marian Guinn, No. 62154 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1985) [hereinafter Brief-B].
182. Brief-B, supra note 181, at 9.
183. Id. at 10. Because of overlap, the only damages actually awarded were for disclo-
sure of private facts. Mr. Wade who strongly supports the "negligence approach" to privacy
reprimands courts for awarding excessive damages. He bases this concern on the fact that
courts should not allow both a privacy and a defamation claim in the same action. He contends
that if both can be claimed, then for the sake of protecting speech, defamation should be the
only claim with its qualified privileges. Courts are not following this approach. In Guinn, just
the opposite occurred, and the "negligence approach" resulted in another large recovery. See
generally Wade, supra note 66, at 1123.
184. Brief-A, supra note 27.
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being violated."
B. Application of Legal Principles
Church discipline litigation exemplifies the type of lawsuit which fits
into the framework of modern privacy law establishing liability for speech
and conduct, previously not actionable under defamation law."8 6 The facts
in Guinn typify the trend in tort law to use a privacy action under circum-
stances which render speech a privileged communication according to the
law of defamation.1 8 This is precisely the result that the authors of privacy
as an independent tort warned against.188
Invasion of privacy is supplanting defamation claims involving church
discipline primarily because the protections for speech and conduct under
defamation law do not apply when the action is labeled invasion of pri-
vacy.' 80 With Guinn, the reluctance to apply defamation protections to in-
vasion of privacy, even where the original complaint was for defamation, is
reflected throughout the court and trial records."" Such a result is indica-
tive of the problem developed earlier, 0 1 showing that a negligence standard
will not afford speech adequate protection under a privacy claim.
Previously, under a common law malice standard and presently under
the stricter standard of actual malice, 1" defamation law protects a church
when practicing its discipline procedure in good faith. Only when the
church violates the intent of church discipline and abuses the use of this
doctrinal practice can church communications be actionable.?'9 The balance
here, protecting the concerns of the church as well as the individual mem-
ber who could be hurt by abuse of the doctrine, is equitable.'"
With negligence as the standard, however, in a suit for invasion of pri-
vacy no such balance exists. An individual can join the religious body vol-
untarily agreeing to abide by the doctrinal tenets 95 and later in a dispute
185. Id. at 13-14.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
187. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 74.
189. See supra notes 82, 84.
190. Brief-A, supra note 27, at 54-60. See generally Wade, supra note 66, at 1112
(question of privileges).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84. The question of excessive publication
raised by the letter sent to the neighboring churches in Guinn is subsumed in this issue and
would be covered by a qualified privilege. See 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel and Slander § 208
(1970).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
193. See 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander §§ 208-209 (1970).
194. See infra text accompanying notes 195-96.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
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situation sue the church for following the rules. Abuse of church discipline
need not occur. The liability now arises out of the mere practice of church
doctrine in good faith, because negligence requires no showing of intent or
abuse of a privilege.196
The letter of withdrawal sent to the church provides the avenue for
finding proof of negligence in Guinn. This letter proves to be the key for the
entire case, allowing the result of liability for disclosing entirely accurate
statements of fact without a wrongful motive."'7 The Guinn court's analysis
to show negligence illustrates the danger of allowing civil courts to decide
ecclesiastical questions.
The trial court ruled that with the delivery of the withdrawal letter,
plaintiff ceased to be a member of the church.'98 This ruling was supported
by the argument that a person is only subject to the procedures of the
church as long as he is a member.19' The conclusion reached by the trial
court was that the church acted unreasonably, disclosing the facts of the
misconduct after receiving the letter.2 0 0
In its simplicity, this logic seems to be persuasive, but a closer exami-
nation indicates that it ignores the basic reason why the common law
treated church communication as privileged communication.20 ' The aim of
the common law was to insure that church discipline matters would not be
justiciable except when abuse was present. The mere formality of a letter of
196. It is here, however, that one disposed to alarm might express the greatest con-
cern over where privacy may be going. The question may well be raised, and apparently
still is unanswered, whether this branch of the tort is not capable of swallowing up and
engulfing the whole law of public defamation; and whether there is any false libel printed,
for example, in a newspaper, which cannot be redressed upon the alternative ground. If
that turns out to be the case, it may well be asked, what of the numerous restrictions and
limitations which have hedged defamation about for many years, in the interest of free-
dom of the press and the discouragement of trivial and extortionate claims? Are they of
so little consequence that they may be circumvented; in so casual and cavalier a fashion?
This is not to say that the developments in the law of privacy are wrong. Undoubtedly
they have been supported by genuine public demand and lively public feeling, and made
necessary by real abuses on the part of defendants who have brought it all upon them-
selves. It is to say rather that it is high time that we realize what we are doing, and give
some consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt.
Prosser, supra note 31, at 401, 423. See also supra note 84.
197. See supra note 84.
198. Brief-B, supra note 181, at 19 (T. 482-483) (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 18-21.
200. "The issue in this case is not one of freedom of religion, but rather the rights of
members of a religious group to sanction both members and non-members." Id. at 23, 27-28
(emphasis added); herein lies Appellee's argument on appeal.
201. As will be discussed, the trial court could not reach this decision without judging
theological doctrine and dictating what is proper. See infra text accompanying notes 205-22.
See also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 666, 678 (1871).
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withdrawal does not make this case any less a religious issue.10 2 Critical,
however, is the fact that the difficulty of establishing state action could
jeopardize any constitutional claim raised for violation of religious free ex-
ercise.2 0 3 As shown earlier, the stringent standards established by the
United States Supreme Court for interfering with religious freedom should
not be so easily avoided. ' Nevertheless, eliminating the equitable balance
of the common law protections made purely ecclesiastical questions vulnera-
ble to civil court jurisdiction in Guinn.
The "right to quit" and stop the disciplinary procedure is an argument
built around property cases2'0 where people leave a church and then try to
determine what the remaining membership can or cannot do with the
church property. The argument is not supported by church discipline cases
because church discipline has traditionally been privileged speech 2 06 and
civil courts do not have jurisdiction to decide strict ecclesiastical matters.2 0 7
Even in church property disputes, the person leaving the church must abide
by the decisions of the religious tribunal 0 8 and cannot dictate to the re-
maining members how they can use the property. 09
Church discipline litigation does not involve a property dispute, and
even though the claim involves an invasion of privacy, the court is forced to
decide questions of religious doctrine and practice as well.210 In Guinn, the
202. See supra notes 39, 201. Citing 1H THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G.
Hunt ed. 1901), Tribe notes that "James Madison labeled the suggestion that 'the Civil Mag-
istrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth' an 'arrogant pretension falsified by contradic-
tory opinion of Rulers in all ages' ". L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 871.
203. See supra note 109.
204. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
205. The following cases, all church property disputes, are cited by Appellee in support
of the withdrawal of membership argument on appeal: Brief-B, supra note 180, at 19-21: Trett
v. Lambeth, 195 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. App. 1946); Katz v. Singerman, 127 So. 2d 515 (La.
1961); Brady v. Reiner, 198 S.E.2d 812 (W. Va. App. 1973); Fuchs v. Meisel, 60 N.W. 773
(Mich. 1894); Church of God of Decatur v. Finney, 101 N.E.2d 856 (11. App. 1951); Trustees
of Pencader Presbyterian Church V. Gibson, 22 A.2d 782 (Del. 1941); Saint John's Greek
Catholic Church v. Fedak, 213 A.2d 651 (N.J. 1965). The underlying question at issue is
whether courts will use a negligence standard or an actual malice standard to decide church
discipline cases. Appellee in Guinn contends that the letter of withdrawal eliminates any first
amendment religion concerns and leaves a simple tort privacy action. Appellee further con-
tends that defamation's qualified privilege does not apply to privacy (thereby avoiding first
amendment speech protections), and that negligence is an appropriate standard. Thus, the
withdrawal of membership argument is central to achieving the desired result. See supra note
84.
206. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
207. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 666, 678 (1871).
208. Id. at 675-76. Congregational groups rule themselves by majority rule. Id. See also
First Baptist Church of Glen Este v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
209. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 675-76.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 211-22. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 39.
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church, upon receipt of the letter, did nothing more than follow its Bibli-
cally-mandated procedure, " 1 acting without malice or actual malice.2 1 2 The
church's doctrine does not allow for aborting the disciplinary procedure
short of the complete process upon receipt of a letter threatening legal ac-
tion.212 In fact, changing the church's disciplinary procedure in this manner
would involve voting to accept a different doctrinal position.2"  Further-
more, such a change would still require disclosure of the underlying facts.216
The likelihood of a church or any assembly adopting a disciplinary pro-
cedure where the offending party controls when and how the procedure will
operate is very slight.2 1 6 To do so would undermine the overall purpose of
211. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
214. Congregational government cannot function without congregational action. To
change a doctrinal position would require complete disclosure of the underlying basis prior to
voting. See supra text accompanying note 26.
215. See supra note 214.
216. ROBERTS RULES OF ORDER defines the disciplinary procedures followed by most
religious and other associational groups:
§ 72. The Right of a Deliberative Assembly to Punish its Members. A deliberative
assembly has the inherent right to make and enforce its own laws and punish an offender,
the extreme penalty, however, being expulsion from its own body. When expelled, if the
assembly is a permanent society, it has the right, for its own protection, to give public
notice that the person has ceased to be a member of that society.
But it has no right to go beyond what is necessary for self-protection and publish the
charges against the member ...
§ 74. Rights of Ecclesiastical Tribunals. Many of our deliberative assemblies are
ecclesiastical bodies, and it is important to know how much respect will be paid to their
decisions by the civil courts.
'Where a church is of a strictly congregational or independent organization, and the
property held by it has no trust attached to it, its right to the use of the property must be
determined by the ordinary principles which govern ordinary associations.
'Where the local congregation is itself a member of a much larger and more impor-
tant religious organization and is under its government and control and is bound by its
orders and judgments, its decisions are final and binding on legal tribunals.
'Courts having no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, cannot revise or question ordinary acts
of church discipline; their only judicial power arises from the conflicting claims of the
parties to the church property and the use of it.' [citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 666 (1871)].
But while the civil courts have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and cannot revise or
question ordinary acts of church discipline, they do have jurisdiction where there are
conflicting claims to church property. ...
§ 75. Trial of Members of Societies. Every deliberative assembly, having the right
to purify its own body, must therefore have the right to investigate the character of its
members. ...
When the charge is against the member's character, it is usually referred to a com-
mittee of investigation or discipline, or to some standing committee, to report upon. ...
[ . . IT]he committee investigates the matter and reports to the society. This report
Danchi: Church Discipline on Trial:  Religious Freedom Versus Individual
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1987
418 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
the disciplinary procedure.2 17 Each time the church attempted to discipline
with a goal of restoration, the erring member could "withdraw" member-
ship and threaten legal action. 18 This would prevent the church from being
personally involved in the private lives of its members and effectively elimi-
nate church discipline as a method of influencing the conduct of church
members. 1 9
Upon joining a congregational church that practices church discipline,
an individual limits his own freedom in exchange for the benefits of becom-
ing a part of a religious association2 2 0 that personally cares for and attends
to the needs of its members. Such an individual does not join the church to
alter or prohibit its doctrinal practice. To allow a member to later sue the
church for fulfilling what it promised to do is gravely inequitable. To allow
the judiciary branch of state government in cooperation with a private indi-
vidual to censor religious speech and chill first amendment freedoms in a
way that would be unconstitutional if accomplished directly is cause for
concern. 221 Yet, allowing civil courts, in the process of deciding claims for
tortious invasion of individual privacy, to dictate what is right doctrine in a
need not go into details, but should contain its recommendations as to what action the
society should take, and should usually close with resolutions covering the case, so that
there is no need for any one to offer any additional resolutions upon it. The ordinary
resolutions, where the member is recommended to be expelled, are (i) to fix the time to
which the society shall adjourn; and (2) to instruct the clerk to cite the member to appear
before the society at this adjourned meeting to show cause why he should not be expelled,
upon the following charges which should then be given.
At the appointed meeting what may be called the trial takes place. Frequently the
only evidence required against the member is the report of the committee .... When the
evidence is all in, the accused should retire from the room, and the society deliberate
upon the question, and finally act by a vote upon the question of expulsion, or other
punishment proposed.
The moral conviction of the trust of the charge is all that is necessary in an ecclesi-
astical or other deliberative body to find the accused guilty of the charges.
H. ROBERTS, supra note 24, at Art. X111 §§ 72-75.
217. The church would effectively be controlled by one individual rather then congrega-
tional majority rule.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 13-25. McGoldrick notes that religion by its
very nature invades the most private areas of human existence. To deal with matters as vital as
one's eternal salvation a church must have the right to be personally involved, and caring
about its members. The tension between trying to reach a wayward member and the alleged
torts is obvious: Attempting to reclaim a long-term member through use of Scriptures, and
fervent dialogue is intrusive. To persist in the face of rebuff is emotionally stressful. Seeking to
bring influence through prayer and persuasion by revealing private information to a congrega-
tion affects privacy; but the business of churches is to be involved in the subjects that touch
people most deeply. See McGoldrick, supra note 7, at 14-15.
220. McGoldrick, supra note 7, at 14-15.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 103-09.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 [1987], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol21/iss2/7
CHURCH DISCIPLINE
theological controversy produces that very result. More important, such
censoring of speech interests has practically gone unnoticed.'22 A just reso-
lution to the problems raised in church discipline litigation cannot require
such violence to constitutional freedoms.
IV. SUGGESTED RESOLUTIONS
The concerns of Prosser and others,"' as played out in church disci-
pline lawsuits, prove to be prophetic. The law of privacy does not ade-
quately protect the church's vital first amendment rights. No simple solu-
tion will satisfy the competing concerns of religious free exercise and
individual privacy raised by church discipline matters."" There are several
approaches that could offer solutions although each presents problems.
A. Extension of Common Law Defamation Privileges to New Torts
One possible solution would be to extend the common law qualified
privilege for church discipline to new torts involving speech, including pri-
vacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 2 5 Actual malice would
be the logical standard for abuse following the example of defamation
law. 2 This proposal's advantages include the fact that historically those
privileges effectively precluded litigating internal church matters, 227 while
at the same time allowing for a legitimate claim when church discipline was
abused and practiced with malice.2 8 In order for this approach to accom-
modate the needs of a plaintiff in a privacy action, courts would need to
interpret the standard of reckless disregard of truth to include the reckless
disclosure of true facts to persons with no legitimate reason to know.2 2 9
222. See supra note 107.
223. See supra notes 84, 196.
224. See generally J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 102, at 448-50.
(discussing a balancing approach to state action issues involving conflicts of rights; a ruling on
state action is in fact a decision on the merits).
225. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493 (1975). The Supreme
Court recognized the limitation of Warren and Brandeis on privacy actions for communica-
tions rendered privileged under slander and libel: "The Warren and Brandeis article....
noted that the proposed new right would be limited in the same manner as actions for libel and
slander where such a publication was privileged communication." The Court applied that limi-
tation to privileged reporting of court records in Cohn. Id. Nimmer argues that the reasons
that support the protection of speech when reputations are attacked always outweigh the pri-
vacy considerations and, therefore, only when disclosure is embarrassing but not defamatory
should speech be more severely restricted. See Nimmer, supra note 31, at 960, 963-65. See
generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, at 868; Kalven, supra note 66, at 341.
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 596(b) (e), 652 G(a) (1977).
227. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 58.
229. Thus, abuse of the privilege by excessive publication would be covered by the stan-
1987]
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The major disadvantage to this approach is that privacy and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress have not carried qualified privileges as
a rule. Encumbering these new torts with what has been a confusing system
of privileges in defamation law is hard to justify.230 Most likely, many
states will not follow such an approach for this reason, and an inconsistent
treatment of first amendment freedoms in church discipline cases will prob-
ably continue,8 1 hardly a desirable solution. 3 2
B. Application of New York Times Actual Malice Standard to Church
Discipline
A second approach, similar to the first, would be an application of the
actual malice standard to privacy actions for church discipline.2"  Such a
resolution will ultimately require a Supreme Court decision to effect a per-
manent change.2 34 This approach could eliminate the need for a qualified
privilege altogether.288 Such a suggestion involves an exception to the
framework currently applied by the courts to protect defamatory speech. 3 6
dard. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, at 833 (privileged to publish it
to any person who reasonably has a duty, interest, or authority in connection with the matter).
230. Wade, supra note 66, at 1113, 1121, 1123-24. Wade emphasizes this problem and
suggests that the confusion is a serious reason why privacy is supplanting defamation law. In
fact, he suggests that intentional infliction of emotional distress will ultimately absorb defama-
tion, assault, privacy, etc. and thereby constitute one system aimed at protecting plaintiff's
peace of mind. Id. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, at § I11.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
232. To leave churches in a position where vital religious practices are subject to cata-
strophic tort liability will only breed litigation.
233. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
234. Extending the constitutional protection for defamatory speech will depend on a Su-
preme Court ruling to that effect. See supra text accompanying note 96.
235. Even within the law of defamation, qualified privileges have not been eliminated
with newly defined constitutional protections of defamatory speech:
The qualified privilege structure has not been automatically abrogated as a conse-
quence of the constitutional privilege for two reasons. First, the common law rules related
to how and when a qualified privilege can be abused in a way that will subject the pub-
lisher to liability are not the same as those related to the constitutional privilege. Second,
the constitutional privilege has not been held to extend to many situations where a quali-
fied privilege would be recognized. This would be especially so with respect to private
publications of defamatory statements about private individuals to further and vindicate
private interests. The complex qualified privileges structure pertains primarily to this type
of defamatory publication.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, at 825.
236. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), the Court defined
defamatory speech as first amendment speech with limited constitutional protection. More re-
cently, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347, 350 (1974) the Court held that
strict liability is unconstitutional for all defamatory speech and noted that the state interest
could justify a negligence standard for private defamation actions.
According to New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, public officials and figures must prove
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The law would simply afford greater protection to speech during discipli-
nary proceedings. Speech, which would otherwise constitute an invasion of
privacy and might only require a showing of negligence 37 by the plaintiff,
would now require the plaintiff to show that the church disclosed informa-
tion knowing it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was
true.238
Legitimate justifications exist for affording greater constitutional pro-
tection to church speech. 39 First, there is the traditional reason that the
speech of churches has inherent value for society.240 Second, the likelihood
of chilling speech and self-censorship is far greater with a group than with
an individual. 2 4  Finally, such an exception would provide the necessary bal-
ance to preclude civil courts from adjudicating theological questions2 42 and
yet provide a forum for the plaintiff in cases of actual malice.
At least two criticisms exist for this proposed solution. First, actual
malice is a slightly more protective standard than common law malice
which required malice in an ordinary sense as compared to knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. 43 For false statements, however,
defamation law now affords an actual malice standard2 44 plus a truth de-
fense. 24 5 True statements, which if false would be defamatory, warrant the
equal protection of an actual malice standard.
Second, critics can claim that such a new application of actual malice
actual malice to recover in a suit for defamation. When a private individual sues for defama-
•tion, if the speech is of public concern, the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
348-50 (1974) held that the plaintiff might only need to show negligence to recover compensa-
tory damages, and actual malice to recover punitive or presumed damages. However, if the
speech is not of public concern, the Court in Dun & Bradstreet held that a showing of less
than actual malice would suffice for recovery of all damages. Most likely, under this analysis
the standard of proof would be negligence for a private plaintiff in a church discipline action
where the information disclosed is not of public concern, assuming the Court would even ana-
lyze a privacy action under the above reasoning. See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986) (recent opinion dealing with this subject involving a media
defendant).
237. See supra note 236.
238. See supra note 236. (i.e. apply the actual malice standard of New York Times).
239. See infra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
240. E.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 596(b), § 596(e) (1977).
241. See supra notes 106-07. The Court in establishing a negligence standard for disclo-
sure of information which is not of public concern regarding a private plaintiff noted that one
reason was the absence of a concern of self-censorship. Such is not the case with a private
organization like a church. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
2939, 2946 (1985). See generally Shiffrin, supra note 24, at 941, 942, 961.
242. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 666, 678 (1871).
243. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2946 n.7. (distinguishes the two).
244. See supra text accompanying note 65.
245. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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is little more than extending to a new privacy action the Supreme Court's
prior application of actual malice in a "false light" case.2" 6 In Hill, the
Court did apply actual malice to one category of privacy suit, 24 7 but the
Court's holding has received much criticism. 4 8 Furthermore, subsequent
decisions by the Court24 9 tend to make the Hill decision highly questiona-
ble. The Court's reluctance to extend the actual malice standard to other
tort actions involving speech will probably preclude this solution. 2 1
C. Define Church Discipline as Non-Justiciable
A third approach would be to preclude church discipline litigation alto-
gether by defining such actions as non-justiciable. 261 A dictate from Con-
gress or the Supreme Court could accomplish this result. The justification
would be that unlike property cases involving churches, courts cannot apply
neutral principles of law in church discipline cases, and excessive and im-
permissible government entanglement with religion is the inevitable re-
suit.252 Therefore, state and federal courts would always lack subject matter
jurisdiction to hear such disputes deferring to the religious tribunals over-
seeing church differences. 52
One criticism for this approach is that it ignores the underlying reason
why the common law applied only a conditional rather than an absolute
privilege to church discipline proceedings.2 5 4 Churches should not be overly
protected. An absolute legal shield would encourage abuses going far be-
246. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
247. Id.
248. Many believe that actual malice is an inappropriate standard for privacy actions
because more speech will not suffice as a remedy as with defamation. E.g., Nimmer, supra
note 31, at 956-65. Nimmer criticizes the Court's application of actual malice in Hill. His
contention is that privacy actions can exist totally without any corresponding defamation
claims. He believes that if a certain offense is actionable as privacy and defamation that the
speech interests should cause the defamation claim to win over privacy and actual malice
should then be applied. Id.
249. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 Ct. 2939 (1985).
250. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975); Gertz, 418
U.S. at 348.
251. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 666, 678 (1871). See also Joiner v. Weeks,
383 So. 2d 101, 106 (La. App. 1980) (ecclesiastical proceedings disciplining minister dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction).
252. The justification requires recognizing that even though the "neutral principles" rule
would rationally apply where personal instead of property issues are in dispute, since church
discipline is an actual doctrinal practice, to decide questions regarding its application where no
malice is involved is to invariably define proper doctrine. Thus, these church discipline quarrels
will always be non-justiciable for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See supra note 39.
253. See supra note 39.
254. Wade notes that conditional privileges allow liability where the privileged conduct
is exceeded or abused. Wade, supra note 66, at 1112. See also supra note 252 (no malice).
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yond protecting speech which is useful to society. Protecting the rights of
individuals as well as churches requires a unique balance where neither
party is given absolute immunity to do whatever they please.
Two other criticisms can be made regarding this recommended solu-
tion. With the broad definition the United States Supreme Court has given
to religion,28 5 to define what constitutes religious disciplinary proceedings
will present an entanglement problem under the establishment clause.2 5
More significantly, case law indicates 57 that the necessary limitations to
jurisdiction already exist subject to the provisions for tort actions. The un-
derlying problem is not so much a matter of justiciability but rather inade-
quate protections for speech under privacy law. What is needed is for courts
to recognize the state action involved in church discipline cases and weigh
the free exercise values as part of any invasion of privacy action arising out
of church government proceedings.2 58 To attempt to remedy the problem by
eliminating jurisdiction altogether would be an absolutist approach 59 to
protection for first amendment rights and would create more problems than
such an approach could rectify.
D. Use Federal Statutes to Prevent Interference with Federal Constitu-
tional Rights
The constitutional draftsmen originally designed the Bill of Rights to
be a limitation on actions by federal government impacting on individual
rights.2 0 Through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 61
the same rights are substantially protected against state interference. 262
Section five265 of the fourteenth amendment explicitly grants Congress the
power to enforce that amendment by appropriate legislation.
255. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (non theistic sincere beliefs qual-
ify); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (religion need not be theistic and need not
recognize a Supreme Being).
256. The problem arises when the state defines certain religious practices as absolutely
protected, preferring them over other theistic or non-theistic practices. See Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
257. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 113-44.
259. Protecting speech whatever the cost.
260. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
261. "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV.
262. The Court rejects the argument that the fourteenth amendment incorporates all of
the Bill of Rights. The Court follows instead a principle of selective incorporation based on
each right in question. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
263. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CoNsr. amend XIV § 5.
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Congress has enacted statutes including 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and
198564 to enforce the fourteenth amendment, proscribing conduct which is
construed to be state action.26 5 Sections 1983 and 1985 exist to protect fed-
eral rights from interference by state government and in some cases private
individuals. 266 Therefore, federal statutes could afford a means for protect-
ing the constitutional rights allegedly being violated through church disci-
pline litigation in state courts.
1. Section 1983 as It Applies to Church Discipline
A party can raise a section 1983 cause of action in federal or state
court.26 For church discipline litigation, a church could sue in federal court
264. 42 USC § 1983 (1982) reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or us-
age, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purpose of this section, any Act of Congress appli-
cable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982) reads as follows:
(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons
conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled
to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or
as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or
property, on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the con-
spirators. (R.S. § 1980).
265. L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 1147 (discussing state action).
266. The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people
from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial.'
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). Section 1985 and § 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act are directed at the maladministration, neglect and disregard of laws by state and local
officials, and have purpose of providing a federal remedy for deprivation of federally guaran-
teed rights. Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 867 (1967).
267. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION §§ 1.09, 1.12
(1979 & Supp. 1985).
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for equitable relief as well as damages.2 68 Such a countersuit would enjoin
the state agent, in this case the state court judge,26 9 from trying the case
infringing upon first amendment rights. Also, the injured party could seek
damages from the private party(s) acting in concert with the state agent.270
In state court, the action would be a counterclaim seeking damages from
the private party involved. 27 1
Whether raised in federal or state court, a section 1983 cause of action
must overcome a number of legal hurdles to succeed. First, raising such an
action requires the injured party to show that a private individual acting
under color of state law committed actions resulting in the infringement of
rights.272 Second, even if the action is under color of state law, the private
party might be covered by a qualified immunity. 272 Finally, for federal
court the utility of section 1983 has been substantially undermined by sev-
eral complex doctrines whereby federal courts can avoid granting relief
without a decision on the merits. 74 Each of these barriers poses serious
questions about the utility of using a section 1983 action in church disci-
pline litigation.
Technically, section 1983 does not require a showing of state action
but only requires the injured party to show that the person violating federal
rights was acting under color of state law.27 '5 However, whenever section
1983 is used to enforce constitutional rights which themselves depend on
state action for violation, the section 1983 action assumes the requirement
of showing state action.276 Therefore, to use section 1983 in church disci-
pline cases to enforce first amendment rights, the injured party will need to
show state action.2 77
268. S. NAHMOD, supra note 267 §§ 4.01-4.13, 5.01-5.17; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 (notes
267, 269) (1981 & Supp. 1986).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 103-09. The agent acting on behalf of the state
in church discipline procedures is the state court judge. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522
(1984) (where the Court held that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive
relief against a judicial officer). See also First Baptist Church of Glen Este v. Ohio, 591 F.
Supp. 676 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (where a federal court granted prospective equitable relief over a
state court's adjudication of church disciplinary proceedings).
270. The state agent, the judge is immune from suit for damages. See S. NAHMOD supra
267, at §§ 4.01-4.13, 7.06-7.09.
271. Jane Murray v. The Church of Christ Northside, No. 15420 (In the Dist. Ct. Val
Verde County Texas, July 1985). See infra text accompanying note 279.
272. See supra note 264.
273. See infra text accompanying notes 282-83.
274. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 264.
276. See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). The argument the Court makes
for § 1985(3) is equally applicable to § 1983 since § 1983 also provides no substantive rights
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One example of how state action might be shown in a church discipline
dispute would be to show a conspiratorial aspect." 8 In Jane Murray v. The
Church of Christ Northside,27 9 as part of a counterclaim in a church disci-
pline lawsuit, counsel raised an issue of conspiracy. According to the plead-
ings, Murray's attorney allegedly solicited the client, encouraging her to sue
the church. 80 Bringing the lawsuit against the church in a Texas state
court allegedly established the involvement2 81 by the state in the conspirato-
rial action, thereby meeting the requirement of showing state action.
Assuming that the injured party can meet the state action require-
ment, the question of a qualified immunity to cover the private party acting
in concert with the state actor arises. In Lugar v. Edmunson Oil Co.,282
Justice White in dicta noted that good faith reliance upon the constitution-
ality of state law might qualify the private party for immunity from dam-
ages. 2 8 8 In church discipline litigation this could mean that the disciplined
church member suing under a state tort action for invasion of privacy
would be shielded from a damage action raised by the church attempting to
enforce first amendment rights under section 1983. Therefore, the church
might be left with no recourse but to seek injunctive relief in federal court
against the state court proceeding. 2"
The most serious limit to using section 1983 in a church discipline dis-
pute is the ease with which federal courts can avoid granting such relief.28 5
278. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (the Supreme Court held that a private
defendant acts under color of state law when conspiring with an absolutely immune judge).
279. No. 15420. (In the Dist. Ct. Val Verde County, Texas, July 1985). This church
discipline case like Guinn involved a member dis-fellowshipped based on sexual misconduct.
The church counterclaimed citing three causes of action: breach of contract, § 1985, and §
1983. The case was settled on the counterclaim on July 31, 1985, with the offending church
member paying the church $4500 upon dismissing her suit. Id. See also 2 THE RUTHERFORD
INSTITUTE 14 (No. 4 Sept./Oct. 1985). See also First Amended Original Answer and Coun-
terclaim of the Church of Christ Northside, et al No. 15420 in the Dist. Ct. Val Verde
County, Texas, at 6-11 [hereinafter Counterclaim].
280. Counterclaim, supra note 279, at 7.
281. State action can be shown through entanglement by the state in the challenged
conduct. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). State action can also be
shown by joint participation by the state in the challenged conduct. See Lugar v. Edmundson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 923 (1982) (the Court found state action without a conspiracy where a
debtor's property was seized through a pre-judgment attachment proceeding). But see Lugar,
457 U.S. at 939 n.21.
282. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
283. Id. at 942 n.23.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 267-69.
285. Numerous abstention and preclusion doctrines severely limit accessability to federal
court when a state court proceeding is already pending. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971) (federal courts use the Younger rule to show deference to state court proceedings. This
rule requires federal courts to refrain from injunctive proceedings where a state action is al-
ready pending and the defendant seeks to stop the proceeding by a federal court injunction or
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In Dayton, the Court was faced with the very same free exercise and estab-
lishment clause issues that lie at the heart of church discipline actions.2 8
The Court held that the district court had erred by not abstaining under
Younger v. Harris, where an important state issue was involved and a state
court forum would provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal consti-
tutional claims. 8 7 Following Dayton, federal court intervention in a church
discipline proceeding will likely only occur where a state court blatantly
ignores federal constitutional claims. Therefore, a church will most likely be
forced to raise any section 1983 action as a counterclaim in state court in
an effort to stop church discipline litigation before full adjudication in state
court.
2. Section 1985 As it Applies to Church Discipline
The same barriers face a section 1985 cause of action in federal court.
Therefore, the church will likely raise a section 1985 action as a counter-
claim in state court. Such an action will seek damages against the private
party defendants.2 88 The requirements for raising such an action are some-
what different than a section 1983 action and, therefore, may better suit the
facts in a particular church discipline case.
To counterclaim in a church discipline case on the grounds of free ex-
ercise, section 1985(3) requires that the defendant prove there is some state
involvement. In Carpenters v. Scott, 289 the Court held that an alleged con-
spiracy to infringe first or fourteenth amendment rights is not a violation of
section 1985(3) unless the state is involved in the conspiracy or the purpose
of the conspiracy is to influence state actions.2 90 Therefore, the same consid-
erations required to show state action for section 1983 will be necessary to
apply section 1985(3) in a church discipline suit.29'
Other critical aspects to a section 1985 action are the conspiratorial
requirement and the requirement of class-based, invidiously discriminatory
declaratory judgment). See also Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941) (the Pullman doctrine requires a federal court to abstain temporarily from accepting
jurisdiction over a federal constitutional claim which may be resolved by the state court adju-
dication of an unsettled question of state law in a pending state proceeding). See also Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986).
286. Dayton, 106 S. Ct. at 2719.
287. Id. at 2719-20. See also First Baptist Church of Glen Este v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp.
676, 677 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (where a federal district court abstained in a § 1983 action from
intervening in on-going state court proceedings involving adjudication of church disciplinary
proceedings).
288. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 (note 269) (1981 & Supp. 1986).
289. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
290. Id. at 833.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 275-81.
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animus.2 92 First of all, two or more persons must conspire to deprive the
injured party of federally protected rights.293 Therefore, proving conspiracy
in a church discipline action will determine the utility of the section 1985
counterclaim. 94 Furthermore, case law consistently requires class-based, in-
vidiously discriminatory animus in order to establish a violation of this sec-
tion.295 Therefore, a church must prove that animosity toward the religious
body based on its beliefs was the motivation behind the concerted efforts to
deprive the church of religious free exercise.
One unique advantage to the approach of using federal civil rights stat-
utes as a means of protecting first amendment freedoms is that new torts
like invasion of privacy would not need to be burdened by the cumbersome
and confusing common law privilege schemes.2 96 The question of whether or
not such statutory counterclaims will survive in the courts is yet to be an-
swered. In the meantime, churches that practice church discipline must
face the reality of an ever-increasing risk of litigation because no adequate
remedy now exists to protect vital constitutional freedoms.2 97
V. CONCLUSION
Under the common law of defamation, churches were free to practice
church discipline without fear of litigation protected by a qualified privilege
and truth as a defense. Changes in tort law have created a framework of
legal principles where religious speech is being censored and first amend-
ment freedoms are being chilled. Churches that practice traditional proce-
dures of church discipline in a congregational setting without any wrongful
motive are subject to excessive liability under actions for tortious invasion
of privacy. The key issue is how far courts should go to protect the right of
privacy.
Religious free exercise dictates that communications carried on by
churches during church discipline proceedings deserve more protection than
292. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
293. Id.
294. Jane Murray v. The Church of Christ Northside, No. 15420 (In the Dist. Ct. Val
Verde County Texas, July 1985). In Murray, the attorney allegedly solicited Jane Murray and
encouraged her to sue the church. Counsel for the church alleged that the conduct of the co-
conspirators was motivated by nonracial class-based animosity toward the church and its El-
ders because of their religious affiliation, beliefs, tenets, practices and because of their exercise
of those beliefs. See Counterclaim, supra note 279, at 10.
295. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 (note 37) (1981 & Supp. 1986). See also Carpenters v.
Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-39 (1983); Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 719 (1981) (§ 1985 is not
restricted to racial discrimination. It can include a conspiracy motivated by nonracial class
animus).
296. See supra text accompanying note 230.
297. Baker, supra note 106.
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currently afforded under the tort law of privacy. Several approaches could
rectify the inadequate protection of privacy law. Courts could apply the
privileges of defamation law to invasion of privacy. Congress or the Su-
preme Court could act to make such church matters non-justiciable. The
Supreme Court could expand the constitutional protections for defamatory
speech to cover speech in actions for invasion of individual privacy. Finally,
churches might be able to counterclaim based on federal statutes to raise
constitutional issues. For the present, however, some churches possess fed-
eral constitutional rights which are nominal, lacking sufficient protection to
allow their exercise without grave risk of litigation.
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